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The Limits of Legal Pluralism in the Roman Empire 
Abstract 
The Roman Empire was legally pluralistic. But what exactly does this entail in concrete terms? With 
the growth in historical studies of legal pluralism in the Roman empire, some significant differences in 
approach have emerged. This paper tests and clarifies some of the limits in the current “legal pluralism” 
conceptual landscape, focussing on disputes and dispute resolution. It is argued that a clearer distinction 
should be drawn between “normative” and “jurisdictional” pluralism, though both approaches still raise 
certain conceptual problems. The place of disputes within the family within this wider institutional 
picture is then taken as a case study in the final part of the paper, and it is suggested that while family 
disputes can evidence “legal pluralism” in the “norms” sense, there is less to suggest that there were a 
multitude of officially sanctioned legal fora available for resolving family disputes. As a result, many 
went beyond the law. This has wider implications for the study of legal pluralism in antiquity and the 
problem of integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) into the pluralistic picture. 
 
I. Introduction 
As a result of the Constitutio Antoniniana, all free inhabitants of the Roman empire became Roman 
citizens and thus subject to Roman civil law.1 For many years, this was thought to be the end of local 
law within the empire: as Ps-Menander later put it, city laws were no longer a suitable subject for praise 
because everyone used the ‘universal laws of the Romans’.2 Roman law was now supreme and reigned 
in beautiful isolation, subsuming all other legal orderings under its wings.3  
This is of course a far too unitary view, and has always been tempered with greater nuance. The extent 
and immediacy of the effects of the Constitutio Antoniniana have been debated, and the co-existence 
of local legal orderings alongside the imperial legal regime has widely been acknowledged.4 Recently, 
                                                     
1 Now exactly dated to 11th July 212 CE: see Peter van Minnen, ‘Three Edicts of Caracalla? A New Reading of 
P.Giss. 40’, 46 Chiron (2016), 205. 
2 Ps-Menander, Treatise I.III.364: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διὰ τὸ τοῖς κοινοῖς χρῆσθαι τῶν Ῥωμαίων νόμοις 
ἄχρηστον (this theme, however, is also pointless, because we use the universal laws of the Romans). 
3 ‘Ein Kaiser, ein Reich, ein Recht’ to quote again the too often quoted Rudolf Sohm, Institutionen: Geschichte 
und System des römischen Privatrechts, 13th edn, Leipzig, 1908, 205.  
4 The literature on this subject is immense: Jose Luis Alonso, ‘The Constitutio Antoniniana and the Private Legal 
Practice in Egypt’, in Kimberley Czajkowski and Benedikt Eckhardt, with Meret Strothmann, eds. Law in the 
Roman Provinces, Oxford, forthcoming, will be a thorough retreatment of the effect of the CA; for recent 
contributions on family law in particular, see Antti Arjava, ‘Paternal power in late antiquity’, 88 The Journal of 
Roman Studies (1998), 147; Antti Arjava, ‘Eine Freilassung aus der väterlichen Gewalt. CPR vi 7’, 14 Tyche 
(1999), 15; Antti Arjava, ‘Die römische Vormundschaft und das Volljährigkeitsalter in Ägypten’, 126 Zeitschrift 
für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (1999), 202; Antti Arjava, ‘The Romanization of Family Law’, in James G. 
Keenan, Joseph G. Manning, Uri Yiftach-Firanko, eds., Law and Legal Practice in Egypt from Alexander to the 
Arab Conquest. A Selection of Papyrological Sources in Translation, with Introductions and Commentary, 
Cambridge, NY, 2014, 175; in the older literature and more generally (i.e. beyond family law), Ludwig Mitteis, 
Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs, mit Beiträgen zur kentniss 
des griechischen Rechts und der spätrömischen Rechtsentwicklung, Leipzig, 1891 remains compulsory reading 
as the father of the subject (Reichsrecht und Volksrecht); see also of course Ernst Schönbauer ‘Reichsrecht gegen 
Volksrecht? Studien über die Bedeutung der Constitutio Antoniniana für die römische Rechtsentwicklung,’ 51 
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung 51 (1931), 277, and Vincenzo 
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this has gone hand in hand with an emphasis on the ‘legal pluralism’ or ‘multi-legalism’ of the empire 
both post- and pre-212 CE, a term and indeed field of study imported from comparative law, legal 
anthropology and sociology that has now gained a large amount of traction in studies of law in the 
Roman world.5 Indeed, a descriptor that was once ground-breaking in turning a centralized, unitary idea 
of Roman (state) law on its head has now become something of the norm in describing the ancient 
landscape.6 And yet there is perhaps less consensus on what this constitutes than one might think, and 
as such what exactly is meant when we state that the Roman empire was ‘legally pluralistic’ bears 
testing in more detail. Despite the growing ubiquity of the label, there are clear limits to the extent of 
the existence of legal pluralism in antiquity both in conceptual terms and in what the ancient evidence 
actually attests. 
A full survey of the practice of law in the empire is beyond the bounds of the current article, but this 
paper will test and clarify some of the limits in the current conceptual and ancient landscape. A brief 
sketch of two of the more influential approaches to Roman legal pluralism will be given below in order 
to demonstrate that they represent somewhat different conceptions of what constitutes a pluralistic legal 
environment. The rest of the paper will then take a two-pronged approach to foreground the limits of 
the extent to which we might describe the legal situation in the early empire as pluralistic. The focus 
throughout is on disputes and dispute resolution. It is argued that a clearer distinction should be drawn 
between ‘normative’ and ‘jurisdictional’ pluralism in our conceptual framework for antiquity, though 
that both approaches to the subject still have certain holes. Furthermore, although there are some clear 
instances of both varieties in antiquity, there are also quite clear limits to the extent of officially 
sanctioned jurisdictional pluralism; the nature of the evidence also limits the extent to which we can 
assess both normative and jurisdictional pluralism in antiquity. The last section then takes this wider 
institutional picture and, in line with the theme of this issue, explicitly considers the place of disputes 
within the family. It is suggested that while family disputes can evidence ‘legal pluralism’ in the ‘norms’ 
sense, there is less to suggest that there were a multitude of officially sanctioned legal fora available for 
resolving family disputes, especially in the realm of marriage and divorce. As a result, many likely went 
beyond the law; while this is sometimes touched upon in the context of ‘bargaining in the shadow of 
the law’, we should go further and consider whether such methods of dispute resolution also constitute 
                                                     
Arangio-Ruiz, ‘L’application du droit romain en Égypte après la Constitution Antoninienne, ’ 29 Bulletin de 
l’Institut d’Égypte  (1948), 83. 
5 See Kaius Tuori, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Roman Empires’, in John W. Cairns, and Paul J. du Plessis, eds. 
Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society in the Roman World, Edinburgh, 2007, 39 for an overview of the 
developments.  
6 Perhaps emblematic of this is that one of the recent English language-handbooks on Roman law and society 
includes a chapter dedicated to ‘legal pluralism’: see Paul J. Du Plessis, Kaius Tuori and Clifford Ando, The 
Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society, Oxford, 2016; see also Tuori, ‘Legal Pluralism’, (2007) for an 
overview until that date; multiple conferences have been arranged on the topic (including that from which this 
journal issue derived, see also that held at CNRS in 2015). The various key pieces of literature on the subject will 
be discussed below, but it is notable how accepted this has now become as a description of the Roman legal 
landscape. 
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a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). A hallmark of modern studies of legal pluralism, this 
is markedly absent from conceptual frameworks for the Roman empire, and its exclusion may involve 
an implicit replication of a centralized state perspective that legal pluralism studies initially sought to 
avoid.  
 
II. Legal pluralisms in the Roman empire 
The Roman Empire was legally pluralist. That is to say, in any given political space, multiple 
bodies of law, deriving from discrete sources, and multiple institutions of dispute resolution, 
potentially held authority over any given issue.7 
It is perhaps easy to forget how revolutionary this statement would once have been. Not only does 
Ando’s formulation emphasize the fact that multiple legal traditions co-existed in the Roman empire, 
but it designates those that did not derive directly from the Roman state as ‘legal’. Custom, vulgar law 
and so on have almost always been acknowledged to exist within the bounds of Rome’s territorial grasp, 
but these are no longer – in name at least – subsumed under the umbrella of the Roman; they are allowed 
to co-exist, and given the label ‘law’. As a result, scholarly attention is not simply directed at finding 
out how Roman law accommodated (or was degenerated by) native legal regimes. 
Now, however, such a statement finds its way into a handbook on Roman law and society. The 
description of the empire as legally pluralist is a given and, except in some minority circles, would 
probably raise few objections, particularly pre-212 CE. But understandings of the meaning of this term, 
and the nature of what it describes in antiquity, remain rather more diverse. Two of the most influential 
approaches to this subject (exemplified by Ando and Humfress) will briefly be outlined here in order to 
reflect on what exactly is entailed in our description of the empire as legally pluralistic, but also what 
is missed. 
To begin with Ando: his position is that ‘Ancient empires were pluralist as a matter of form,’8 and the 
legal sphere is no exception to this. As the above quotation encapsulates, there were multiple authorities, 
bodies of law and institutions of dispute resolution within the political entities of empire: this is 
essentially a description of (Ando’s conception of) the meaning of legal pluralism, and it is a wide-
ranging one, taking into account pluralism in legal sources, regulations and fora. However, Ando’s 
focus thereafter is more normally on a distinctly Roman viewpoint, concentrating for the most part on 
Roman courts and on how they dealt with the foreign subjects and non-Roman laws that came before 
them.9 This takes as its centre what might be termed state legal pluralism: the recognition by the state 
                                                     
7 Clifford Ando, ‘Legal Pluralism in Practice’, in du Plessis, Tuori, and Ando, Handbook, 283. 
8 Clifford Ando, ‘Pluralism and Empire: From Rome to Robert Cover’, Critical Analysis of Law and New 
Interdisciplinarity 1:1 (2014). 
9 Ando, ‘Legal Pluralism in Practice’. 
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of ‘other’ law for (more or less) limited purposes.10 While this is sometimes labelled ‘weak’ legal 
pluralism,11 the designation undermines its significance: it is a vital area of study for understanding the 
ideology and practice of the Roman state and the officials who represented it.  
Humfress shares some assumptions in her starting point with Ando, particularly on the pluralistic nature 
of empire and legal pluralism as the default in the earlier period: 
To move from early to late Empire is thus to shift – in the broadest terms – from a Roman 
hegemony in which complex interactions between multiple legalities are taken as fact, to a late 
Roman hegemony in which emperors and centralised bureaucrats laid down the law for their 
provincial subjects.12 
She of course then tackles head on the latter assumption, arguing that ‘multiple legalities’ persisted into 
the late Empire.13 But her approach to the subject then differs quite considerably from Ando’s, in that 
she typically takes a more ‘bottom-up’ approach, considering how litigants themselves negotiated the 
possible options available to them, most notably in a case study of ‘Forum Shopping’.14 The approach 
is explicitly less statist,15 explicitly flipped to the local, social, even individual viewpoints.16 And here, 
implicitly at least, the quintessential mark of plurality is the existence of multiple fora from which 
litigants may choose (to a greater or lesser extent): the focus is not on the Roman court per se. Humfress  
labels this an ‘institutional’ approach to legal pluralism,17 and the emphasis on what constitutes 
plurality, and thus what we take as our concentration of study, differs significantly in concentration 
from Ando.  
The approaches are not mutually exclusive, and indeed we need both: to what extent did the Roman 
state allow for multiple legalities – either in the sense of legal norms or legal fora – and how, why and 
to what extent were provincial subjects able to use them? But in isolation the two approaches – aside 
                                                     
10 See William Twining, ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective’, 20 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law (2010), 473 at 490). Ando’s wider definition also perhaps might be labelled legal 
polycenticrity (i.e. the use of multiple sources of law within the state legal system), though his greater focus is on 
the former aspect.  
11 John Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986), 1. 
12 Caroline Humfress, ‘Thinking Through Legal Pluralism: ‘Forum Shopping’ in the Later Roman Empire’, in: 
Jeroen Duindam, Jill Harries, Caroline Humfress, and Nimrod Hurvitz, N. eds. Law and Empire. Ideas, Practice, 
Empires, Leiden, 2013, 225. 
13 While Humfress is often concerned with the post-212 CE world, her work does concern (and have further 
implications for) the situation before the Constitutio Antoniniana. 
14 Humfress, ‘Thinking Through Legal Pluralism’, especially at 233, ‘Roman legal institutions as social 
constructions … focus on local institutionalised contexts and on the point of view of the litigants.’ 
15 Though the alternative fora that Humfress, ‘Thinking Through Legal Pluralism’, discusses are those that are 
recognized in some way by the Roman state: there is a gap here, that will be discussed below, for ‘non-official’ 
or ‘non-recognized’ methods of dispute resolution and how these in turn may act to preserve (or not) a pluralistic 
situation. 
16 For this approach to one particular provincial group, see Kimberley Czajkowski, Localized Law: The Babatha 
and Salome Komaise Archives, Oxford, 2017.  
17 We might perhaps label this ‘jurisdictional pluralism’.  
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from a starting assumption of multiplicity in the early to high empire – take as their core different 
meaningful criteria for designating a situation legally pluralistic. Ando may still have legal pluralism 
without a multiplicity of jurisdictions;18 Humfress’ ‘institutional’ approach leaves this less clear.  
 
III. The Extent of Legal Pluralism within Roman Courts 
That Roman judges were willing to take into account, consider and even consistently apply non-Roman 
law – both before the Constitutio Antoniniana and after – is now beyond question.19 Our best 
documented province in this matter, Egypt, makes this abundantly clear: in fact, judging in accordance 
with what is presented as the indigenous legal ordering seems to be the norm from which there were 
exceptions, rather than vice versa. The survival of sibling marriage, for example, – completely contrary 
to all Roman norms – encapsulates the strength of this principle:20 in short, Roman judges consistently 
upheld peregrine norms in status, family, and inheritance.21   
Objections can be made to this picture, most notably on the basis that the majority of the evidence 
comes from Egypt. The ‘specialness’ of this province has long been a point of debate (and in some 
circles is still an accepted principle). There is a rightful pushback against this,22 and almost any given 
province can be subject to arguments for its particularity. Other provinces are not as well documented, 
but the evidence we do have does not suggest that we should a priori assume that Roman officials 
behaved in a significantly different manner (to generalize), and a general acknowledgment that 
                                                     
18 This is not to state that jurisdictions are not mentioned in the conception but that the designation of the empire 
as pluralistic can stand without this part. 
19 See Jose Luis Alonso, ‘The Status of Peregrine Law in Egypt: "Customary Law" and Legal Pluralism in the 
Roman Empire’, 43 The Journal of Juristic Papyrology (2013), 351 on Egypt; traces are certainly also available 
elsewhere even after the Constitutio Antoniniana (see, for example, P. Dura 126, a sententia dated to 235 CE, in 
which an ‘ἀγράφως’ division that took place ‘according to the custom of the village’ (κατὰ τὴν συνή]θ̣ει̣αν̣ τῆς 
κώμης) is upheld). 
20 Efforts to deny the practice have largely been unconvincing. On sibling marriage, see inter plurima alia Paul 
John Frandsen, Frandsen, Incestuous and Close-kin Marriage in Ancient Egypt and Persia: an Examination of the 
Evidence, Copenhagen , 2009; Sofie Remijsen and Willy Clarysse, ‘ Incest or adoption? Brother-sister marriage 
in Roman Egypt revisited’, 98 The Journal of Roman Studies (2008), 53; Sabine Huebner, ‘‘Brother-Sister’ 
Marriage in Roman Egypt: A curiosity of Humankind or a widespread family strategy?’, 97 The Journal of Roman 
Studies (2007), 21; Silvia Bussi, ‘Mariages endogames en Egypte’, 80 Revue Historique de Droit Français et 
Etranger (200), 1; Walter Scheidel, ‘Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt’, 29 Journal of Biosocial Science 
(1997), 361; and Keith Hopkins, ‘Brother–Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt’, 22 Comparative Studies in Society 
and History (1980), 303; Joseph Modrzejewski, ‘Die Geschwisterehe in der hellenistischen Praxis und nach 
römischen Recht,’ 81 Zeitschrift für Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung (1964), 52 
for an older, thorough treatment of the legal problem. 
21 Alonso, ‘The Status of Peregrine Law’, 353. 
22 Alan K. Bowman and Dominic Rathbone, ‘Cities and Administration in Roman Egypt’, 82 Journal of Roman 
Studies (1990), 107 remains an important contribution; more recently see Livia Capponi, Augustan Egypt: The 
Creation of a Roman Province, London and New York, 2005; Andrea Jördens, Statthalterliche Verwaltung in der 
römischen Kaiserzeit. Studien zum praefectus Aegypti, Stuttgart, 2009; Andrew Monson, From the Ptolemies to 
the Romans: Political and Economic Change in Egypt, Cambridge, 2012; and Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Romanity 
of Roman Egypt: A Faltering Consensus?’, 43 Journal of Juristic Papyrology 43 (2013), 73. 
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preserving local norms would make the business of keeping order in a vast empire an easier matter is 
broadly to be accepted. 
But were there limits to the existence of legal pluralism under this interpretation of the term (normative 
pluralism)? Take the sibling marriage example. This is used to demonstrate that even when practice 
directly contravened Roman norms, it could persist and be upheld. Nonetheless, there are counter-
examples: judges seized on precedents to overrule the ‘inhumanity’ of the law of the Egyptians that – 
allegedly – allowed fathers to forcibly divorce their daughters.23 The judgments cited by Dionysia in 
her dispute with her father in 186 CE are the typical examples used to illustrate this,24 and here indeed 
Dionysia manages, among other paperwork, to cite a previous decision by the prefect Flavius Titianus 
ordering that the wife should have the final decision,25 as well as another decision by the epistratēgos 
Paconius Felix that explicitly follows Titianus’ decision.26 Thus, non-Roman law may indeed have been 
regularly upheld, but there was no guarantee of this, and the extent to which Romans did uphold local 
legal norms still – in many cases – came down to the preference of that particular judge.27 
If we move west, the materials for the mix of normative orderings within a Roman court is more scarce. 
While a good number of contracts have survived, judgments by Roman officials are thinner on the 
ground and the nature of the evidence with which we are dealing is generally of a different type: less 
documentary records of petitions, decisions and so forth, and more epigraphic materials, which 
represent, of course, a direct and deliberate decision on what to memorialize.28 This makes direct 
                                                     
23 See Claudia Kreuzsaler and Jakub Urbanik, ‘Humanity and Inhumanity of Law: The Case of Dionysia’, 38 
Journal of Juristic Papyrology (2008), 119 on this rhetoric. It should also be noted that although this is the most 
famous connection in which this reference is discussed, it is also cited in the papyri relating to other matters 
(including testamentary freedom, see P. Oxy XLII 3015). Furthermore, given the vast amount of literature on the 
‘law of the Egyptians’, we might point out that it was not necessarily so well-known to the Roman officials in 
Egypt in antiquity: it is referred to in only a limited number of papyri (see n.24 below), and in Dionysia’s case in 
P. Oxy. II. 237, the matter is referred to the prefect because there has been no prior decision on this matter in 
particular (col. VII, ll.4-8). Precedent was obviously not well enough known to merit an instance decision, and it 
is perfectly possible that Dionysia’s father, Chaeremon, had gathered equally compelling precedents that he could 
use to uphold his rights (which, although we are informed of their existence, do not survive for us). 
24 Though references are also made in P. Oxy IV 706, l.7 (=M.Chr 81), 73 CE; P. Oxy XLII 3015, l.3 (post 117 
CE); P. Tebt. II. 488, ll.21-27 (post 121-122 CE), CPR I. 18 (=M. Chr. 84), 124 CE.  
25 P. Oxy. II. 237, Col. VII, ll.19-29.  
26 P. Oxy. II. 237, Col. VII, ll. 29-38. 
27 See Czajkowski, Localized Law, 166-198 for this position, detailed at greater length. 
28 A full survey of the evidence from the West is beyond the bounds of this paper. In terms of the documentary 
record, the Dacian Tablets are obviously vital. Materials have also recently been unearthed in Britain, some of 
which include legal documents, and the latest excavations from Vindolanda, once the tablets are published, may 
add to our data. Most normally we are dealing with contracts (rather than decisions: though from the Bloomberg 
tablets, WT51 (76 CE) does refer to a case and a fragmentary petition survives among the Vindolanda tablets in 
Tab. Vindol. II.344). See, for example, among the new Bloomberg tablets, WT 44 and WT 53 (loans); WT 55 is 
also a loan note, comparable with the Dacian material (e.g. FIRA III. 122 and 123 [=IDR I. 35 and 33]); other 
tablets have what look like quite precise Roman legal terms: for example, WT35, which includes dedi arram, 
though the form of the document is more epistolary; WT 56 refers to a promise given in good faith (dari fide 
promis{s}it); WT 61 includes a reference to mutuum, cf. Tab. Vindol. II.193. The curse tablets from this region 
also provide little information for consideration: in other areas these will sometimes concern lawsuits, but Britain’s 
defixiones are for the most part against thieves. Little of any of this helps with disputes within the family but does 
give us some idea of the evidentiary landscape. 
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comparison challenging. The municipal laws are a rich source for legal ordering in the provinces, and 
do preserve jurisdictional evidence that will be discussed in the next section. There are also some 
fascinating glimpses into the problems arising in such communities and Roman attempts to preserve 
the status quo: the lex Irnitana, for example, explicitly allows non-Roman patrons rights over (newly-
created) Roman citizens, thus preserving a pre-existing power structure in explicit legal terms, in direct 
opposition (from the Roman viewpoint) to the hierarchy of their respective legal statuses.29 We may 
also note that this statute states that any matters between municipes that are not dealt with in its text are 
to be transacted according to the Roman ius civile.30 The gap thus often filled in the East in practice – 
as we see it – by provincials wrangling over what legal ordering pertains to their situation,31 and 
bringing forth their own evidence to argue for it, is here very explicitly closed off for these municipes 
in the form of the ius civile.  
The difference in evidence remains here, and potentially western provincials could argue in court in the 
same way as their eastern counterparts. But the penalties imposed for ignoring or circumventing the lex 
Irnitana are striking, and while we should assume that other provincials from non-municipia elsewhere 
in the west were perfectly capable of approaching the law with the same sophistication as their eastern 
counterparts,32 those in the community subject to this statute were not allowed this opportunity. The 
status of the community is entirely different: this is a municipium, not a peregrine community and thus 
the ideological tie to Rome is closer, the need to mimic the conventions of Rome as a polity more urgent. 
All this raises an interesting paradox in terms of the freedom to choose between different laws and legal 
fora for those of different statuses: did peregrini have greater flexibility than Latins or Roman citizens? 
For the moment: higher legal status does not seem to have accorded with greater choice of law.33 
An objection to this would be based on the history of each region: in the west, there were nowhere near 
the developed legal traditions that we find in the East (especially in many areas with the long tradition 
of Hellenistic poleis). And even if we as modern observers undercut this with appeals to a more fluid, 
anthropologically orientated idea of what law is, it might still be objected that the key issue is that the 
Roman view was otherwise: that they saw the west as a barren wasteland of civilization, and thus devoid 
of law before their advent. Thus there was no space to allow for indigenous legal orderings because, in 
the Roman mentality, these simply did not exist. 
                                                     
29 Lex Irnitana Ch. 97. 
30 Lex Irnitana Ch. 93.  
31 See Ari Z. Bryen, ‘Judging Empire: Courts and Culture in Rome’s Eastern Provinces’, 30 Law and History 
Review (2012) 771 on this process. 
32 See Kimberley Czajkowski and Benedikt Eckhardt, ‘Law, Status and Agency in the Roman Provinces’, Past & 
Present 241 (2018), 3. 
33 This is not to saw that privilegium fori could not be conceived as a privilege: see FIRA I. 73 (= AE 1936, 136) 
for an edict of Vespasian granting doctors and teachers the right to choose in which court they brought suits 
concerning breaches of the edict. 
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This does not seem to have been the case. First, Roman elites were capable of seeing the inhabitants of 
all parts of the empire as barbaric (or not) – the Egyptians, whose legal traditions were indeed upheld 
(as we have seen above), were hardly viewed in the most positive light by many Roman authors.34 
Similarly, the western barbarians could enter Roman elite discourse as exempla of order and civilization. 
Remaining in the broad realm of family law, take, for example, Tacitus’s comments in around 98 CE 
on the marriage customs (mores) of the Germani:35 
Their marital practice, however, is strict, and indeed no part of their manners is more 
praiseworthy. Almost alone among barbarians they are content with one wife, except a very 
few among them, and these not from lust, but because their nobility procures for them many 
marital ties. The wife does not bestow a dowry (dos) on the husband, but the husband on the 
wife. The parents and relatives are present, and pass judgment on the marriage-gifts (munera), 
gifts not procured to suit a woman's taste, nor such as a bride would adorn herself with, but 
oxen, a bridled horse, a shield, with a spear and a sword. With these presents the wife is 
espoused, and she herself in her turn brings her husband a gift of arms. This is their strongest 
bond, these their sacred mysteries, these their nuptial gods. So that the woman should not think 
herself apart from aspirations of noble deeds and from the perils of war, she is reminded by the 
ceremonies which inaugurate the marriage that she is her husband's partner in toils and dangers, 
destined to suffer and to dare with him alike both in peace and in war.  
There is much here to appeal to a Roman mentality: a sense of austerity, monogamy (for the most part), 
an exchange of gifts in the form of a dowry and the involvement of close family and relatives. Even in 
cases where these barbarians succumb to polygamy, it is done for political/pragmatic reasons, not 
libidine. In their marital practices, then, the Germani are to be admired: strict and solemn. This is the 
most praiseworthy of these foreigners’ customs and – it is hinted – should be emulated. 
Whether, of course, this bears any relation to the actual marriage practices of the Germani at this time 
is another matter altogether.36 ‘The other’ serves as an ideal here, and the contrast with Rome is made 
                                                     
34 See, for example, Cicero, Pro Rab. Post. 34-36; BAlex. 24; though note the cautions of Erich S. Gruen, 
Rethinking the Other in Antiquity, Princeton, 2010, at 74-106, that these characterizations – from the Roman era 
– often refer to Alexandria rather than Egypt as a whole, for obvious political reasons.   
35 Tacitus, Germania 18 (translation adapted from Church and Brodribb): Quamquam severa illic matrimonia, nec 
ullam morum partem magis laudaveris. Nam prope soli barbarorum singulis uxoribus contenti sunt, exceptis 
admodum paucis, qui non libidine, sed ob nobilitatem plurimis nuptiis ambiuntur. Dotem non uxor marito, sed 
uxori maritus offert. Intersunt parentes et propinqui ac munera probant, munera non ad delicias muliebres 
quaesita nec quibus nova nupta comatur, sed boves et frenatum equum et scutum cum framea gladioque. In haec 
munera uxor accipitur, atque in vicem ipsa armorum aliquid viro adfert: hoc maximum vinculum, haec arcana 
sacra, hos coniugales deos arbitrantur. Ne se mulier extra virtutum cogitationes extraque bellorum casus putet, 
ipsis incipientis matrimonii auspiciis admonetur venire se laborum periculorumque sociam, idem in pace, idem 
in proelio passuram ausuramque. Also note the following chapter on the punishments for adultery. 
36 To pass over the fact that Tacitus had no first-hand contact with the Germani, this is one of those key passages 
where his moralizing purpose comes directly to the fore: his Germani are a model of strictness and chastity to 
serve as a mirror image to what he perceives as the problem of degeneracy and immorality of imperial Rome. 
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more stark by the fact that such admirable values are placed in the hands of the barbari. Germanic 
mores are better than the Roman ones and the ceremonial aspects of the marriage reinforce these 
further.37 Whether this is real is irrelevant for Tacitus’ purposes of using the barbarians in order to shine 
a light on Rome’s depravity. The point is that the Germani do have admirable mores in the realm of 
what we would classify as ‘family law’: Tacitus may not use ius or lex in this connection, but given the 
laudatory tone, and his views elsewhere on leges, this is not perhaps intended as denigration.38 Thus 
while this may be pure imagination, it undercuts the assumption that Roman elites viewed the Western 
people as entirely without legal custom of their own. In their imagination, these could look more 
acceptable to Roman norms than that of the Eastern population. There should, therefore, be space for 
these to persist, be acknowledged and recognized within a Roman court context (and beyond the context 
of the municipium and colonia). 
To return to our starting point, Ando’s approach to legal pluralism therefore in has a wide application. 
The question is how meaningful the existence of such normative pluralism is, and indeed how deliberate 
it was. The Roman state of the early and high empire was not the large bureaucratic machine of late 
antiquity: the framework was in many ways skeletal, the officials not by any means legal experts, and 
communication of principles and precedents dependent on elite networks and transference. Roman law 
was not yet codified, and was in this period open to competing ideas and constructions of what it 
meant.39 This idea of law must in some ways be by default pluralistic: there is little to no practical 
mechanism by which it could be anything else. To survive and persist as an entity, Roman law – in the 
sense of the gradually emerging corpus that included and reflected the standards by which magistrates 
judged within the many Roman courts throught the empire – had to be expansive, had to become an 
ideological construct with fluid, changeable and changing legal details.40 If Roman law is pluralistic in 
this period in and of itself, then we might question the extent to which we can meaningfully describe 
this situation within the Roman court as pluralistic.  
Essentially, approaching the empire as legally pluralistic in this way brings us directly up against the 
‘What is law?’ question. This may not ever be answered, but it is a vital factor in determining the extent 
of legal pluralism in this sense. If Roman law had defined limits, then judging by the law of ‘others’ in 
a court constitutes a deliberate decision somewhere along the line to allow for a pluralistic environment. 
If it is by its nature conceived as more fluid, more wide reaching, then the level of active allowance of 
                                                     
These chapters are also most certainly an indirect reflection on the function and effectiveness of the Augustan 
marriage laws. 
37 Gruen, Rethinking, 150-151, proceeds on the basis of a distinct separation between morals and laws, in part 
because of Tacitus’ comment at Germania 19: plusque ibi boni mores valent quam alibi bonae leges. This holds 
to a point, but that Tacitus makes the comparison is telling: these fall within the same sphere and – most 
importantly – are supposed to have the same function in society.  
38 And indeed Tacitus’ views on legislation are mixed: see Germania 19; Annals 3.25-27, especially at 27: iamque 
non modo in commune sed in singulos homines latae quaestiones, et corruptissima re publica plurimae leges. 
39 Bryen, ‘Judging Empire’. 
40 Czajkowski and Eckhardt, ‘Law, Status and Agency’. 
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pluralism is more limited since this all falls – very broadly – under the ‘Roman law’ sphere in 
magistrates’ minds. This may be and – I shall concede – is too overarching and too broad a definition. 
But where on this spectrum we draw the boundary must be determined in order to make any definition 
of this situation as legally pluralistic meaningful. An urgent question to be considered is therefore what 
exactly the bounds of Roman law were in the early and high empire. 
 
IV. The Capacity to Forum Shop: The Institutional Set-Up  
We then turn to the second approach: i.e. the extent to which litigants could forum shop.41 Indigenous 
legal traditions could be appealed to within a Roman court, and perhaps even constructed in a certain 
way to suit that particular forum; if, however, this is all that exists – i.e. litigants can appeal to 
indigenous norms within a state forum – then this places severe limits on the extent to which the 
landscape of the Roman empire really did allow for multiple legal orderings (in addition to some of the 
more theoretical problems outlined above). Within this picture, the judge and the forum are still a 
representation of the Roman state:42 we are dealing with a multiplicity of laws within a monopoly on 
jurisdiction. The picture given there is not that of jurisdictional pluralism, and indeed if this were the 
whole picture, then the ability of litigants to forum shop was nil. 
The ideology of the Roman state might certainly present this picture: Rome was, after all, the 
embodiment of civilization, and the bringing of civil order and law to the barbarians was a part of this.43 
Velleius Paterculus’ picture of the Germani coming to the Roman commander on the frontier to have 
their cases heard may indeed show their subversion of the Roman ideology on their part and the 
undermining of the Roman commander in question,44 but it is also a powerful example of the Romans’ 
own attitude towards their law and others: they bring law and order to populations unfamiliar with it. 
This is, of course, the stereotype and an exaggerated one at that, which has already (in part) been 
deconstructed above. It would also cause immense practical problems for Roman officials, with a 
minimal supporting bureaucracy, to subsume for themselves every matter for decision, the resolution 
                                                     
41 It should be noted that this approach is not confined to antiquity. See Ido Shahar, ‘State, Society and the 
Relations Between Them: Implications for the Study of Legal Pluralism’, 9:2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2008), 
417, at 436: ‘from the point of view of an active individual agent, “strong” legal pluralism exists if he or she may 
choose to appeal in a particular matter to more than one tribunal or ”legal mechanism”.’ 
42 This is not to state that the Roman governor was the only official available to make judgments within, to take 
the examples used in the last section, Egypt: petitioners could and did take their complaints to local administrators 
too (for example the strategos). But these were subsumed within the Roman state infrastructure: local courts 
ceased to exist with the Roman conquest. This might have led to a considerable amount of variation in judgments, 
rules applied etc but within the formal structure these were all ‘state’ officials and judgments.  
43 See Caroline Humfress, ‘Law, Bureaucracy and the Practice of Government and Rule’, in Peter Bang, 
Christopher Bayly, and Walter Scheidel, eds., The Oxford World History of Empire, Oxford, forthcoming, Section 
4, ‘Legalism from below’ for a wide-ranging overview of this (Western) ideology. 
44 Velleius 2.118.1; on which see Clifford Ando, ‘Law and the landscape of empire’, in Stéphane Benoist, Anne 
Daguet-Gagey and Christine Hoët-van Cauwenberghe, eds., Figures d’empire, fragments de mémoire: pouvoirs 
et identités dans le monde romain impérial (IIe s. av. n.è.—VIe s. de n.è.), Paris, 2011, 25 at 47. 
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of every single dispute and to disallow all else to the point of actually forbidding it. Thus, the ideology 
may not match the reality. This is also leaving aside the idea that the Romans’ conception of law and 
order as presented from the imperial standpoint does not necessarily match that of their newly conquered 
subjects.  
But there are also concrete examples of limited jurisdiction being allotted to the judges of particular 
communities. The municipal laws, mentioned above, are in some ways the encapsulation of Roman 
imperial ideology: setting up miniature Romes across the West, with regulated institutions and careful 
apportioning of jurisdiction. To take the example used above, the copy of the Flavian municipal law 
preserved (in part) in the lex Irnitana does allow for some local jurisdiction:45 first, there is a limit 
placed on the private cases between municipes and incolae that the duumviri can hear of 1000 sesterces 
(with further exceptions);46 though they seem to have been able to hear cases over this limit if both 
parties agreed.47 But this is all, of course, in the setting of a Latin municipium (with a few Roman 
citizens and incolae about too), i.e. a highly Romanized setting, and we might wonder about the level 
to which these local institutions also consciously mimicked their higher Roman counterparts. The 
inclusion of the incolae here is telling – we are not simply dealing with citizens of the municipium, but 
the cases are all within its territorial bounds. What happened beyond these is another matter. 
Turning east, the level of the governor’s interference in local court jurisdictions may have varied. In 
Egypt, the local jurisdictions from the Ptolemaic era were subsumed into the Roman infrastructure: 
there was the state system or nothing.48 It should of course be noted that these newly ‘subsumed’ 
administrative posts were not (for the most part) filled with Romans, but staffed by natives. As such, 
                                                     
45 Ernst Metzger, ‘Agree to Disagree: Local Jurisdiction in the lex Irnitana’, in Andrew Burrows, David Johnston, 
and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds. Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Oxford, 2013, 
207; Alan Rodger, ‘The Jurisdiction of Local Magistrates: Chapter 84 of the Lex Irnitana,’ 84 Zeitschrift für 
Papyrologie und Epigraphik (1990), 147. 
46 The exceptions are mostly those which would involve infamia if the defendant were condemned; also those 
which have deliberately been separated in order to avoid the 1000 sesterces limit and certain actions involving 
praedudicia or begun by praediudicales. 
47 The terms of this particular chapter in the lex Irnitana have provoked quite some debate, as has the connection 
with the jurisdiction allowed to aediles: the various editions of the text all have comments on this, and among the 
extensive literature, Metzger, ‘Agree to Disagree’; Armando Torrent, ‘Lex Irnitana: cognitio de los magistrados 
locales en interdictos, y limitación a su competencia por cuantía’, 12 Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da 
Universidade da Coruña (2008), 987; Dieter Nörr, ‘Lex Irnitana c. 84 IXB 9–10: “neque pro socio aut fiduciae 
aut mandati quod dolo malo factum esse dicatur”’, 124 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung Romanistische Abteilung  
(2007), 1; G. P. Burton, ‘The Lex Irnitana, Ch. 84, the Promise of Vadimonium and the Jurisdiction of Proconsul’, 
46 Classical Quarterly (1996), 217; Wilhelm Simshäuser, ‘La juridiction municipale à la lumière de la lex 
Irnitana’, 67 Revue historique de droit français et étranger (1989), 619; Alan Rodgers, ‘The Jurisdiction of Local 
Magistrates: Chapter 84 of the Lex Irnitana’, 84 Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 84 (1990), 147; and 
Karl Hackl, ‘Der Zivilprozeß des frühen Prinzipats in den Provinzen’, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 
Romanistische Abteilung 114 (1997), 141 at 151-152, represent a spread of opinions on this particular issue; see 
Metzger, ‘Agree to Disagree’, 210, nn.16-18 for further literature. I am inclined to agree with Metzger’s recent 
corrections to the chapter, that suggest that this agreement meant that duumviri could also have jurisdiction over 
the listed exceptions except those cases involving a praeiudicium de capite libero: this is less limited than some 
other interpretations. 
48 See Alonso, ‘The Status of Peregrine Law’, 352.   
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the categorization here is institutional: these officials were part of the state infrastructure, though of 
course their own training, background and expertise may have fostered the survival of local normative 
orderings within this context. In Roman Arabia, the Babatha archive presents a picture of the governor 
acting in ‘splendid isolation’, with little trace of non-Roman institutions.49 More generally, local courts 
did not necessarily have their rights of jurisdiction firmly secured in the lex provinciae, where these 
existed,50 but this did not prevent governors from choosing to leave much of the business to the cities 
themselves, if they so wished.51 Free cities are then a further matter here, where we would very much 
expect that the citizens of these settlements could preserve their local traditions.52 A further question 
would be whether these citizens were then able to turn to the Roman jurisdiction instead of their local 
legal forum. Certainly in some cases, the Romans seem to be able to be brought in as enforcers. Note 
the appeal to Pliny concerning the feud between Dio Cocceianus and Flavius Archippus, represented 
by Claudius Eumolpus, in the boulē of Prusa,53 which seems a deliberate attempt to avoid a local 
judgment at Prusa: Eumolpus, who had also explicitly brought in Pliny, then tried to have the case heard 
by him at Nicaea.54 Many of those involved were Roman citizens, which may provide one reason for 
the appeal to Rome. But the principle of appealing to an outside authority to avoid local jurisdiction is 
telling and does, indeed, seem to constitute an ability to forum shop. 
This for the most part concerns the matter of the extent to which the Roman state allowed or granted 
jurisdiction to non-Roman fora. But there are typically further spaces of (in-)justice which do not 
necessarily make it into official cognizance unless they actively seek to do so: village councils, local 
‘big men’, religious, social or economic authority figures acting as arbitrators, mediators or even judges 
                                                     
49 Hannah M. Cotton and Werner Eck, ‘Roman Officials in Judaea and Arabia and Civil Jurisdiction’, in Ranon 
Katzoff, and David Schaps, eds. Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, Leiden, 2005, 23 at 24; the only 
local institution attested is the boulē of Petra (P. Yadin 12). There is no trace at all of ‘local’ courts; see 
Czajkowski, Localized Law, 133-165 for an attempt to trace other possible ways of resolving disputes.  
50 See Georgy Kantor, ‘Greek Law under the Romans’, in Edward Harris, and Mirko Canevaro, eds. The Oxford 
Handbook of Ancient Greek Law, Oxford, 2015 on the variance of the jurisdictional privileges granted to poleis, 
among a good overview of jurisdictional variance in the East; see also Julien Fournier, Entre tutelle romaine et 
autonomie civique: l’administration judiciaire dans les provinces hellénophones de l’Empire romain (129 av. J.-
C.–235 apr. J.-C.), Athens, 2010, 397–501. 
51 Most famously, see (in the late Republic) Cicero’s comment (Att. VI. 1) that he let Greeks adjudicate private 
suits according to their own laws amongst themselves (multaque sum secutus Scaevolae, in iis illud in quo sibi 
libertatem censent Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se disceptent suis legibus). But the explicit statement of this 
means it was not a given: Cicero, indeed, presents it as benevolence on his part.  
52 Even when this contravened Roman legal regulations: see, for example, Pliny Epp. 10.92-93 where Amisus, as 
a civitas libera, may form a benefit society (eranum habere; 10.93) but in other cities quae nostro iure obstrictae 
sunt they are strictly forbidden. The Cyrene edicts also allow a considerable amount of autonomy to Greeks and 
– although these are occasionally cited as wider proof of local autonomy in the empire – these apply primarily to 
free cities (note too the limits imposed, for example, on Roman citizens being able to act as accusers in murder 
cases in Edict I: see James H. Oliver, Greek Constitutions of Early Roman Emperors, Philadelphia, 1989 no.8 for 
the text with English translation and commentary). 
53 Pliny, Ep. X. 81.  
54 Indeed, Eumolpus seems to have wanted to lock horns with Dio but on no account at Prusa (which was indeed 
Dio’s hometown, and he seems to have had some standing there), thus selecting a different forum where he would 
(hopefully) gain a more favourable hearing.  
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and enforcers.55 When dealing with antiquity, any ‘court’ or form of dispute resolution that is not 
explicitly sanctioned by the state may be less likely to leave a trace. The probability of a written record 
of some sort might increase the more elite the group we deal with,56 but for the majority – the 
economically poor perhaps – unless, for example, their dispute was brought before a Roman forum, it 
would be unlikely to leave a record. If it were resolved through negotiation or mediation or local 
‘unofficial’ forms of adjudication, and potentially judged based on tradition in that village as it had been 
carried out for decades or centuries, it would vanish. Thus one of the key contexts in which – in modern, 
post-colonial contexts in particular – we find potential for forum shopping, remains for the most part in 
antiquity in the dark.  
Yet in antiquity as in modernity, disputes within the family are particularly vulnerable to resolution 
through various ‘unofficial’ forms. The point at which we typically learn of them is when they reach a 
Roman court or state official: here, we may get part of the back-story (especially if it involves other 
official channels), but this is in general a very partial window. The following section will constitute a 
first step in assessing whether we can indeed trace other forms of dispute resolution within the family 
and whether and how these relate to the extent of normative / jurisdictional pluralism within antiquity.58  
 
V. Beyond the Law  
The above has set out a broader landscape of what we might expect in institutional terms within the 
Roman empire, but where do disputes within a family context fall in all this? Those relating to marriage 
and divorce provide a useful focus, both in view of the concerns of this volume, but also as they offer a 
good case study for possible non-state (or beyond the state) legal orderings: these were private legal 
transactions that – unless problems arose – would have no need to come to the state’s attention.59 
                                                     
55 This is an area still under-studied as ‘dispute resolution’ in the Roman world: for an example of what may be 
done for Ancient Greece, see Sara Forsdyke, ‘Street Theatre and Popular Justice in Ancient Greece: Shaming, 
Stoning and Starving Offenders Inside and Outside The Courts’, 201 Past & Present (2008), 3; Torrey Seland, 
Establishment Violence in Philo and Luke: A Study of Non-Conformity to the Torah and Jewish Vigilante 
Reactions, Leiden, 1995 also leans in this direction in his studies on Luke and Philo. The most obvious place to 
look for mediation, arbitration and local judges is in some ways the rabbinic material, but this is highly problematic 
to take as a description of reality and is redacted later than the principal time period under consideration here. See 
n.57 for further bibliography on late antiquity. 
56 It might work its way into historical accounts, or indeed the increased economic wealth involved made 
documentation of the agreement more likely as a safeguard. 
58 Ari Z. Bryen, Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation, Pennsylvania, 2013, 142-143) does 
include this into his definition of ‘strong legal pluralism’ (taken from John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ 
26 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (1984), 1), though assumes as a given that such ‘informal’ 
methods (‘ranging from shaming and moral censure … to brute violence against transgressors of the normative 
order’) existed, then focussing primarily on the implications for the (multiple) sources of law in Roman Egypt. 
While I am sympathetic to this, from the more institutional perspective the conclusion of these alternative venues 
needs further interrogation. 
59 The Augustan marriage legislation does represent an (unusual) direct state interference in marriages between 
those of different statuses, but this was geared towards a small circle of the Roman elite, not peregrini throughout 
the empire.  
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Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that this is an area where a multiplicity of legal traditions survived.60 It 
is, however, a different matter then to identify a range of available fora.61  
Some disputes, possibly those that were the most entrenched, most vitriolic, least likely to be settled by 
other methods, certainly came to a Roman court or a Roman sanctioned official.62 In Egypt, from which 
most of our evidence derives, this was most often the stratēgoi in the Roman period: primarily drawn 
from the regional population, they served in this state administrative post. The disputes brought to them 
would then be subject to the concerns that fell under the first category in this paper: normative traditions 
within a state setting.63 In this, as we have seen, litigants could and did appeal to local norms and could 
be successful in their claims (though were not guaranteed to be so): the request in P. Oxy. II. 281 for a 
repayment of the dowry plus an extra 50% by a certain Syra, for example, is certainly a local practice, 
and Syra here turns to the archidikastēs to have it enforced.64 This seems to have been imposed as a 
                                                     
60 We have, for example, a good sample (over one hundred) of marriage contracts from Egypt and the Near East 
in the early to high imperial era, which take a variety of forms (see Uri Yiftach,  Marriage and marital 
arrangements: a history of the Greek marriage document in Egypt, 4th century BCE - 4th century CE, Munich, 
2003, on the possibility that there may have been different regional traditions in Egypt). These include different 
forms of Greek contract (homologia, for example BGU IV 1052 (= Sel. Pap. 1.3) from Alexandria in 13 BCE; 
ekdosis, see P. Oxy. III. 496 (127 CE, Oxyrhynchos), often thought to be more common in Oxyrhynchos than 
elsewhere in the Roman era, although see also P. Yadin 18, 128 CE from Roman Arabia); alimentary contracts 
(see, for example, the abstracts on the recto of P. Mich. II. 121, Tebtynis, 42 CE); Latin contracts (from Roman 
citizens, see, for example, P. Mich. VII. 434 + P. Ryl. IV. 612, c. 2nd century). Elsewhere, in the Near East, we 
also have Aramaic contracts, see P. Yadin 10 from Roman Arabia, c. 125 CE. ‘Deeds of Divorce’ also attest 
various practices (see n.68 below for bibliography).  
61 See Ilias Arnaoutoglou, ‘Marital Disputes in Greco-Roman Egypt’, 25 Journal for Juristic Papyrology (1995), 
11 for an excellent assemblage of the papyrological material and the disputes therein.  
62 Based on the idea that one would not take the time and expense of turning to a Roman forum unless all other 
methods were exhausted, a settlement could not be reached otherwise, or the dispute had become so intractable 
that it was hoped that recourse to the Romans would at least give an added stimulus towards settlement. This 
should not be taken as a return to the typology of Deborah W. Hobson, ‘The Impact of Law on Village Life in 
Roman Egypt’, in Baruch Halpern and Deborah W. Hobson, eds., Politics, Law and Society in the Ancient 
Mediterranean World, Sheffield, 2003, 193, whereby this is the last resort: it is perfectly possible that litigants 
used the recourse to the Roman court simultaneously with other bargaining methods, on which see Benjamin 
Kelly, Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt. Oxford, 2001, 285. In the Roman era before the 
CA, petitions to officials that concern disputes between spouses (or ex-spouses) include:  P. Oxy. II. 315 (37 CE), 
the petition of Tryphon complaining about an assault by his ex-wife Demetrous and her mother on his current 
wife, Saraeus; P. Mich. V. 227 (c. 47 CE), is a fragmentary petition to the strategos of the Arsinoite nome that 
mentions an argument between a husband and wife; P. Oxy II.281 (20-50 CE), a petition to the archidikastēs from 
Syra, complaining of desertion and attempting to reclaim the dowry plus half more; SB XVI 12627 (127/8 CE), 
the beginning of a complaint by a husband that mentions a former wife and a dowry; PSI V.463 (158-160 CE) is 
from a wife against her former husband concerns the removal of household objects; PSI X. 1104 (175 CE) is a 
further complaint by a wife; P. Heid. III.237 (2nd century CE), a complaint about a wife who had absconded with 
much of the husband’s property; P. Tebt. II. 334 (200-201 CE) is from a wife accusing her husband of absconding 
with the dowry; P. Coll. Youtie I.24 (121/122 CE) differs slightly as it concerns the repayment of a dowry by the 
brother-in-law to the wife after the husband’s death. 
63 Though of course with the added complication that the official in question was a ‘native’: this in turn might 
foster greater normative pluralism within the state system, as they made decisions based on their own expertise. 
64 Likely because the marriage contract was a συγχώρησις; on his jurisdiction, see Arnaoutoglou, ‘Martial 
Disputes’, 26, n.27; Anna Calabi, ‘L’ ἀρχιδικαστής nei primi tre secoli della dominazione romana’, 32 Aegyptus 
(1952), 406 and Rafał Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, 2nd edition, 
Warsaw, 1955, 489, n.64. 
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penalty in marriage contracts when the husband had not returned the dowry within a specific time,65 
suggesting that Syra had turned to the archidikastēs after some delay (in which her husband had not 
repaid her). She thus here follows a fairly regular pattern of turning to a state official as an enforcer of 
a local norm.  
But in all likelihood a very small segment of the number of disputes that occurred reached state 
attention. This might either have been a deliberate choice (settling by other means) or necessity (a 
Roman court would be an expensive option that not all would be able to access). In some, for example, 
we see the petitioners are explicitly using this as a last resort. To take P. Heid. III. 237 from the 2nd 
century CE, from a petitioner whose name is lost: he complains his wife has left with a good amount of 
his property (items of which are described in detail), and did not react even though he had repeatedly 
contacted her about them (ll.14-16); it is only after he had learned that she had remarried that he 
petitioned a centurion.66 Though fragmentary, the petition here makes quite clear that we in fact only 
learn of this dispute because other methods had failed: this would otherwise have remained completely 
outside the cognizance of the officials and come nowhere near the Roman court. There is no extra 
forum, but other methods to resolve family (or ex-family) conflict are very clear. 
If we take the issue of divorce further – and so disputes that either led to the dissolution of the marriage, 
or arose as part of the settlement process – we may say that there were some sensational divorce disputes 
that did indeed end up before a Roman magistrate in antiquity.67 But there were also a large number 
that did not: we have examples of just over 50 so-called ‘deeds of divorce’, which represent settlements 
as the result of ends of the marriage.68 Typically the matter of concern is to record the return of the 
dowry and safeguard against bringing any future claims. These therefore mean that a) divorces of 
anyone without means would be unlikely to leave a trace (no documentation was needed to make the 
divorce ‘legal’ in the early empire, and so such receipts would only be needed if there was money to 
sort out); b) these constitute private settlements, which may legitimately be considered another means 
of settling a dispute or avoiding a future one. Here, the only outside influence may have been the writer 
of the contract, though we may note that many of these receipts also involve various members of the 
family who seem to have been involved in the dispute resolution process.69 The parties therefore use 
                                                     
65 These are typically called ἡμιολία clauses, and appear in several Greek language marriage contracts from Egypt 
from both the Ptolemaic and Roman era: see M. Chr. 284 (second century BCE), BGU IV. 1050 (=M. Chr 286) 
(12-11 BCE) and P. Oxy. III. 496 (=M. Chr. 287) (127 CE).  
66 See also P. Oxy. II. 282 (29-37 CE) for a similar fragmentary complaint about a wife absconding with property.  
67 Particularly sensational is a much later (4th to 5th century) papyrus, that details a far from happy home life at 
length (P. Oxy. L. 3581). See Arnaoutoglou, ‘Marital Disputes’, 22-24 for a very good overview of such disputes. 
68 See Jakub Urbanik, ‘Divorce’ in Keenan, Manning and Yiftach-Firanko, Law and Legal Practice, 154 on these 
documents and divorce more generally; see also Hans-Albert Rupprecht, Studien zur Quittung im Recht der 
Graeco-Ägyptischen Papyri, Munich, 1971, 43-51 and J. Lesquier, ‘Les actes de divorce gréco-égyptiens. Étude 
de formulaire’, 30:1 Revue de Philologie de Littérature et D’Histoire Anciennes (1906), 5 for older treatments of 
the documents.  
69 See P. Mil. Vogl. III. 185 (=SB VI. 9381) (139 CE), which involves the wife, her mother, her father (acting as 
guardian for both women), the husband and his father: the four (presumably excluding the father acting as 
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other means – including informal negotiations and arrangements within the families – to come to a 
settlement. None of these modes of resolution have anything to do with a Roman legal forum, except 
to try to avoid recourse to it later, and to a certain extent the parties involved were free to come to 
whatever arrangements they pleased.  There could be constraints on this freedom – stipulations in the 
marriage contract, previous contracts concerning the dowry, a general expectation on what one might 
obtain if they did go to court or a state official – but the flexibility remained.  
Of course the distinction between state and non-state is not so clear-cut, and the manner in which the 
private settlements and the ‘informal’ methods of resolution interacted with state-sanctioned legal fora 
is key. This is, indeed, in some ways in the nature of what Mnookin and Kornhauser termed ‘bargaining 
in the shadow of the law’.70 The parties could for example choose to turn to an official to ratify an 
agreement. P. Oxy II. 268, for example, addressed to the archidikastēs, records an agreement in which 
Ammonarion and her daughter Ophelous agreed to accept a sum of money in lieu of Ammonarion’s 
dowry and her daughter’s inheritance from the father’s (Herakles) property from Antiphanes. From 
what we can tell this was an entirely private arrangement, in accordance or reasoned out from laws 
governing inheritance in Egypt and the wife’s right to the dowry: we learn of it only because the parties 
decided to record it with the archidikastēs, who otherwise seems to have had no role to play in reaching 
the settlement.  The registration may have been due to the increasing use of documents by the state (thus 
representing a trickle-down effect). 
The impression we receive, however, is that in the realm of marriage and divorce, and disputes arising 
from them, there was little ability officially to ‘forum shop’, and there is little evidence of jurisdictional 
pluralism as allowed for by the ruling power. What we find instead is a general tendency to avoid 
‘official’ legal fora altogether unless trying to enforce repayment of a dowry or reclaim property (and 
there, it often seems that other means have failed). Legal pluralism may therefore have been preserved 
in the ancient world – in the institutional, ‘forum shopping’ sense – not primarily though the active 
sanctioning or recognition of alternative jurisdictions by the state but by the shadowing of the courts, 
by the existence of alternative legal venues and informal methods of dispute resolution.  
The close relation of these activities to ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’71 – methods by which 
agents attempt to avoid judgment by official courts, or bargain alongside them - has already been 
mentioned. But these modes of resolving disputes also fall broadly under the sphere of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR), and have long been a staple of a certain strand of scholarship on ‘legal 
                                                     
guardian) all agree to the terms, suggesting they were all active parties in the contract. See also P. Fouad. I. 34 
(70s CE) and P. Lips 27 (=M. Chr. 293) (123 CE) for two other divorce settlements that involve multiple parties. 
70 Robert H. Mnoookin and Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’, 88 
The Yale Law Journal (1979), 950. 
71 This often used phrase is taken from Mnoookin and Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining’; this concerns negotiation tactics 
in modern divorce cases, the large majority of which are settled before reaching court. See Becky Batagol and 
Thea Brown, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Family Mediation, The Federation Press, for an 
updated perspective, that takes the Australian situation as its focus. 
17 
 
pluralism’: ADR mechanisms are acknowledged to be one of the key means in which legal pluralism 
thrives.72 ADR is defined in fairly broad terms: while policy definitions often focus upon the assistance 
of a neutral third party to allow disputants to come to a compromise (i.e. most normally arbitration and 
mediation), anthropological definitions that go beyond modern western state contexts are much more 
wide-ranging. One foundational study, for example, includes ‘gossip, fear of ostracism, dependence on 
others for economic assistance and political support, and mediation by village leaders.’73  Even those 
activities that fall under this wide-ranging definition of ADR have, however, garnered less attention in 
studies of antique legal pluralism than in modern counterparts, despite their vital role in the latter.74 The 
problem of evidence mentioned in the previous section provides good, even justified, explanation for 
this, and yet the kinds of activities we see in the realm of marriage and divorce provide grounds for 
supposing a large role for ADR in antiquity. 
If the ‘informal’ methods of resolving disputes were the way in which indigenous legal orderings in 
particular thrived, and these could indeed expand to, for example, mediation or decisions by village or 
religious leaders,75 then we are stepping back from what was the key advance in using ‘legal pluralism’ 
to redescribe the antique situation (i.e. undermining the idea of law as just state law) if we then do not 
classify these as forms of legal fora. We do so because we are explicitly replicating the state perspective: 
only state recognized courts may be labelled as legal fora, and thus enter into considerations of forum 
shopping. This is a perfectly legitimate methodological and categorical choice, but it stands in stark 
contrast to many of the other tenets held in studies of legal pluralism. It also then raises certain urgent 
questions concerning the perspectives we adopt and where we draw our conceptual boundaries.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                     
72 Most recently, see the concise formulation by Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice’, 20 
International Studies Review (2018) 438 at 438-439.  
73 See Sally Engle Merry, ‘Anthropology and the Study of Alternative Dispute Resolution’, 34 Journal of Legal 
Education (1984), 277. 
74 See, for example, one of the foundational articles Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 22 Law & Society 
Review (1988), 869 at 881; on the ancient side, Traianos Gagos and Peter van Minnen, Settling a Dispute: Toward 
a Legal Anthropology of Late Antique Egypt, Michigan, 1995 give a foundation of what might be done in late 
antiquity, when mediation and arbitration (and indeed more formalized manifestations of these) become much 
more widely attested than court litigation; Jill Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity. Cambridge, 1999, 175-
190 has also tackled out-of-court settlement in this later period. Otherwise a general study of antique ADR is 
lacking. 
75 CTh 2.1.10 (= CJ 1.9.8), a constitution from Arcadius in which the decisions by the patriarch and Jewish courts 
are brought under the umbrella of the Roman legal system represents a point at which such tribunals come into 
official recognition: see Jill Harries, ‘Creating Legal Space: Settling Disputes in the Roman Empire.,’ in Catherine 
Hezser, ed. Rabbinic Law in Its Roman and Near Eastern Context, Mohr Siebeck, 2003, 63 on this consitution. 
Such tribunals certainly did not spring into existence overnight and constitute precisely the kind of “unofficial” 
legal fora that might have been available to litigants; the question (from a modern perspective of categorization) 
is then whether we see the existence of such tribunals as constituting the ability to forum shop. 
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Different manners of studying a subject do not necessarily pose a problem, but when underlying this 
there is also a different conception of the matter at hand, these may need defining further. We have 
begun to reach that point in the study of ‘legal pluralism’ in the Roman Empire, when we need to define 
more carefully what this entails in antiquity, and more precisely where we reach the ends of both this 
theoretical construct and its existence in the ancient world.  
 
The two key approaches examined here both open up new problems that will need to be tackled in order 
to push the subject further. Both are, in some senses, conceptual: if we look purely at pluralism of norms 
within a Roman ‘state’ court, we end up coming square up again the ‘What is law?’ question. This is 
particularly acute as a problem for the early to high empire, the period before codification. If, indeed, 
we also adopt more recent definitions of Roman law as still in the process of being determined, as still 
in many ways a construct in this era, then this perhaps undermines the extent of ‘pluralism’ in this sense: 
Roman law could, to a degree, be viewed as rather inclusive, pluralistic by its very nature; the existence 
of ‘legal pluralism’ in the sense of ‘other’ laws then begins to look less certain. This is certainly too 
expansive a view, but the problem remains. 
 
The ‘institutional’ approach also raises further questions that need definition in the terms of ‘family 
law’ in particular. We can see clear cases where Rome delegated authority to local courts, often with 
limits as to value or type of case, but space and iurisdictio is allotted nonetheless. Most clearly, we see 
this for free cities and indeed in delegation of authority to local magistrates within municipia, though 
in both cases questions have been raised as to the extent of pluralism this then entailed. If we fully factor 
in ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ and ADR, which it has been suggested were likely prime 
candidates for dispute resolution for family disputes, then the range of fora available from which to 
shop may have been greater. The normal lack of necessity for either formal legal process in order to 
make a divorce valid, as well as family pressures, and the close connection of the participants all 
increase the likelihood of this. Thus it is highly probable that this atmosphere created a multiplicity of 
potential methods for resolving disputes beyond those recognized by the state. 
 
The question is whether this constitutes jurisdictional pluralism of any kind. From the viewpoint of the 
Roman state, the answer is a clear ‘no’ – these alternatives were not officially recognized, not granted 
iurisdictio. From a modern perspective, this may not be so clear cut: if the alternative methods were the 
norm, the manner in which many local traditions were preserved, and indeed if the provincials 
themselves saw these as either viable alternatives or first options, this could be said to constitute a type 
of ‘jurisdictional’ pluralism. We must then decide whether this is pushing the case too far. We can 
certainly state that for the sphere of marriage and divorce, there was limited ability to forum shop for 
participants between officially recognized courts, but that this did not lead to the death of non-Roman 
forms of marriage, nor indeed to a dearth of methods of dispute resolution. Indeed, the majority of 
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resolutions probably remained beyond the state. This is where we may need to tighten our categories 
and think through the labels we impose more closely: in a legally pluralistic ancient world where do 
informal, alternative methods of dispute resolution fit, particularly when it was partially through these 
that non-state normative orderings survived and even thrived?  
